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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 18/05/2006

Accident number: 256

Accident time: 13:40

Accident Date: 25/08/1999

Where it occurred: Plowshare Minefield,
Cordon Sanitaire

Country: Zimbabwe

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: KMS

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: M969 AP blast

Ground condition: woodland (bush)

Date record created: 18/02/2004

Date last modified: 18/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
inadequate medical provision (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
inadequate training (?)
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Accident report
At the time of this accident the demining company operated in two-man teams using a oneman drill. One deminer looked for tripwires, cut undergrowth, used the detector and
excavated finds while the other watched from a safe distance and "controlled" him. The group
issued frontal protection and their drills assumed that the deminer would kneel or squat while
excavating.
An internal Accident report was made available by the demining group in December 1999.
The report was dated 3rd August 1999,which was before the accident occurred - so either the
date of the report or the accident date was an error. The following summarises the content of
the report.
The victim was engaged in widening a breaching lane at 13:40 when the accident occurred.
He was not using approved marking methods [using none] and the accident occurred 3
metres in front of his base stick. His equipment had been removed from the site but witnesses
confirmed that the victim's visor and prodder were some metres behind the victim [visor not
worn] and that the handle of his trowel was a metre from the accident site.
At the time of the accident, the victim's partner had left the site to fetch more area-marking
sticks.
Immediately after the accident the victim was recovered from the unmarked area and his
"boots, watch and fragmentation vest" removed. At this time "the casualty was struggling so
restraint was necessary". Field medics treated the casualty and brought him to the ambulance
at the start of the breach. The ambulance had entered the breach and had to "conduct
numerous turns within the breach to turn around".
All clearance at the site was halted.
The investigators found no evidence of excavation around the blast crater, which was "cone
shaped and symmetrical". The shaft of his trowel was in the crater. They stated that "the
blade of the trowel was not found and is more than likely the instrument which caused the
injuries".
A chronology of events related that the accident occurred at 13:40, the ambulance left for the
air strip for Medevac at 14:32 and the Medevac aircraft left taking the victim to hospital at
16:16, [more than 2 ½ hours after the accident occurred].
The investigators decided that the mine was an M969, although the type was "not confirmed".

Conclusions
The investigators concluded that the victim was working without a visor, not marking correctly
and had used "incorrect excavation methods". They found that his partner "was not present to
correct any faults". In their opinion "complacency had set in" and the victim was taking short
cuts. They decided that immediate treatment and medevac was "adequate" but that too many
people had been involved in the reaction. Casualty recovery had been "conducted without
control, placing further risk on those persons present".

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that a seven day period of complete re-training should start,
and that deminers should have warnings about complacency and the need to work to SOPs
stressed. They stated that "all personnel will be evaluated. All re-test failures will be released
from the project. For all personnel who pass the evaluations, and further breaches of safety
will result in instant dismissal".
Further recommendation included re-training in Medevac procedures for field supervisors, the
rule that medics should never enter a breach that is only a meter wide (in these cases the
Supervisor and Paramedic must recover the casualty) and that ambulances should not enter
breaches.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 330

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: more than 2 hours 40
minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Face
severe Hand
FATAL
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
A "Preliminary medical report" was made available by the demining group in December 1999.
It stated that between 14:00 and 14:25 the victim was attended at the site hospital, then sent
to Mukumbura airstrip for medevac. The vehicle broke down at Msingwa river and the victim
was transferred to an accompanying vehicle. The evacuation aircraft arrived at 15:45 and left
for the capital city at 16:16.
The "casualty sustained severe deep maxillofacial injury with right hand second degree
burns". "2-way intravenous fluid giving lines established at time of handing over casualty".
In an interview with senior staff at the demining group in December 1999, they said that the
victim had died about a month after the accident while still in hospital. His demining tool
(trowel) had struck his face side-on and “cut it in half”.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim
was in breach of many basic SOPs and his errors went uncorrected. The decision of the
management group to impose re-training and testing implied that the urgent need for
improvement was recognised, although local employment laws may have made it difficult to
implement. It is not known whether the recommendations were carried out. The secondary
cause is listed as “Inadequate training”.
In an interview with representatives of the demining group's management in December 1999,
the researcher was told that the head of the tool was believed to have struck the victim in the
face and caused injuries that were eventually fatal.
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The deminer's trowel was a locally made item with a steel handle welded to a steel blade. The
picture above shows one of the group's trowels after a similar accident. In this case the trowel
is still in one piece although badly deformed.
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